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Not so long ago, the world was changing rapidly and America was coming out the winner. The Berlin Wall fell, the Iron Curtain vanished, the Cold War faded and Germany was united again. At least one arms agreement, tf Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which reduced the U.S. Pershing II and the Russiz SS-21's missiles in the European theater, was in place.
Then the euphoria evaporated.
Th, Kremlin hardliners regained power and balked at signing a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement -a treaty which only a year ago would have reduced to approximate parity the si of United States and Soviet Forces in Europe.
Was America ready for this new Soviet challenge? Thankfully the answer is still yes. The United States continues to maintain i Nuclear Triad --land, sea and air deliverable nuclear weapons systems.
On the European battlefield the U.S. maintains the ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons t--vcrcomc the Russian Army's numerical advantage and remain responsive to the ground commander. Al' this should give Kremlin hardliners (strict communist power brokers, primarily in the mil:
and KGB) reason to pause.
Given Europe has grown and prospered without the threat of war due to the nuclear deterrence. Contrast this picture of a war free Europe with the millions of Asians, Africans and Latin Americans dying or wounded in regional (third world) wars.
Then it follows that selected future battles will take place In emerging, third world nations.
Tactical nuclear weapons provide deterrence against the unpredictability of the Kremlin hardliners. Their preference for a stronger Soviet military machine may well include a nuclear buildup. if so, this increasingly plausible scenario could lead to nuclear proliferation between the superpowers in Europe and In the third world. Given this new hostile environment, the U.S. must retain the will and ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons in a variety of -,cenarlos. To do less may mean the eventual downfall of freedom as we know It today. This paper examines the future utility of tactical nuclear weapons on the European and third world regional battlefields.
HIATO'S NUCLEAR POSITION FOLLOWING 'dW II
The democratic countries of Europe understood in the eacy 1950's that the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was unlikely to raise its conventional forces to a level necessary to meet a massive Soviet grounU challenae. There was an initial interest In using tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military deficiencies. Eventually it became less costly in political and economic terms to use nuclear systems to counterbalance the conventional military superiority of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies.
At first, the United States possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons throughout the world, supported by a doctrine of first use of nuclear weaoons.
The threat of first use served as a strong deterrent when U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles stated In January, 1954: "The United States intended In the future to deter aggression b depending primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at I places of our own choosing." But this strategy of massive retaliation was replaced by a strategy of assured destruction and later replaced by the strategy of flexible response.
When NATO adopted the flexible response strategy in 1967 It was designed to keep us well clear of the nuclear threshold; we stipulated that there would no longer be an automatic nuclear response to conventional Soviet-Warsaw Pact aggression. By then, the NATO governments were willing to use all available conventional means to preserve NATO territory. Should that fall, then the prospects of using tactical nuclear weapons would greatly increase. If tactical nuclear weapons did not work, then the next option would be the U.S. use of strategic nuclear weapons. These responses were subjected to political con-trol and designed to deter aggression and preserve peace. They were also planned to sustain the secucrty ot the N,'rth Atlantic Treaty area within the framework of Forward Defense.
United States nuclear presence has provided a continued long term balance in Europe and Qrztected our own national interests. There is no need tu celearn the lessons of history. Rather, we should continue to observe the qrcitegic principles that have led to this period of peace: -U.S. nuclear and conventional presence means deterrence.
-The U.S. must maintain a modern nuclear deterrent force in Europe.
-The U.S. will respond appropriately to any attack with a mix of conventional and, if necesgary as a last resort, nuclear weapons.
-The U.S. nuclear triad is even more essential now with the reduction of NATO conventional forces and the formation of multinational corps.
-Nuclear forces provide Insurance against rapid changes, which may cause -e, y V .. 11n hardl:r'os to o-!!r the Soviet military to pursue an adversarial posture.
-The U.S. will continue to seek international agreements which limit conventional and nuclear weapons In Europs.
Most of all. U.6. and European security are linked. with an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces designed to preserve peace and security and not start a war. It will also serve as an indi*-3 pensable guarantor of peace.* In other words, nuclear weapons will continue to provide the leverage for insuring future peace in Europe. Likewise. the U.S. would continue to pursue arms control agreements as a long-range mechanism for peace.
Through arm3 control, the U.S. seeks to enhance strategic cooperation and to preserve reduced levels of conventional armament, while reducing the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. During an earlier summit, an accord was sianed in which both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to cestroy most of Its chemical weapons stockpiles. Each nation agreed to stop production, to reduce warheads to an equal level and to develop appropriate in-4 spection procedures to view each others sites. Next the U.S and Soviet Union seek to agree to future talks aimed at reducing shoct range nuclear systems 5 (SNF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
But in view of the sudden rise of Kremlin hardliners and their crack-down in the Baltics, these new nuclear arms reduction treaties now appear remote. reruced role however, they have now become a prudent insurance polIcy for the Wes'. it cnly as ,a weapon of last resort. luclear weapons thus contirue 1o tulfill an essential role in the overall strateay of the NATO Alliance: they serve to prevent wac ty ensuring that no circumstances arise in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action Is needed. In fact. NATO has decided to update its strategy following the decisions taken durinq the London Conference in July 1990. The conference protocol stated that the alliance will maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe. It went on to say that the nuclear weapons would be used only in self defense, thereby justifying maintaining the lowest and most stable level of nu-6 clear forces necessary to prevent war. The net result appears to be that primarily older and less capable equipment is being removed from the Soviet Forces. while newer equipment will be distrib- This sheltering of equipment will allow the Soviet Union to maintain numerical 9 superiority over the forces of NATO. Third, the retention of newer equipment- 7 troop strength and eliminate tanks, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and 12 combat aircraft. These countries are currently on their own and expected to join the Conference on Security and C3operation in Europe (CSCE) and eventually to become democratic states. History has shown that the risk of war with these countries will thus be minimized, since democracies have never fought 13 each other (except during the U.S. Clvil War).
Soviets have also announced that they are restructuring their remaining ground forces, which pleases the old traditional communist hardline's. Soviet Divisions are losing tank strength, yet they are gaining more armored combat vehicles air defense systems. anti-tank systems, engineer and artillery equip-14 ment. These upgraded divisions will be capable of maneuver oriented. combined arms. offensive operations. They will also receive a higher portion of modernized equipment than currently provided to Soviet Divisions. The result will be a modernized design which will be more efficient and will allow them to tackle a modern enemy force on equal terms.
Thus the Soviet conventional threat still exists. even though the Soviet Armies are further away from their old adversaries. This translates into greater warning time for NATO Nations. Conversely, the Russians have not announced a similar reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. They have, however. agreed to participate In future bilateral discussions with the United States to negotiate the reduction of short-range nuclear systems. But this discussion has been put on hold due to the lukewarm attitude displayed by the Sovi-15 ets in implementing basic parts of CFE Treaty. Thus the uncertainty in Europe does not preclude that a modernized Russian Force will not return in the future with military power to occupy their former garrisons in a free Europe. Sixteen regional nations are currently developing the ability to build a nuclear weapon to achieve their political, military and ecnoinic aims. Iraqinmediately comes to mind as a country that was working to achieve such a goal. The world io ditfe-ent today as it faces challenges to peace and tre-domr, and thus represents new and uncertain challenges in 199t. The United States must be capable ot meeting all contingencies and bearing up tu its arave world wide responsibilities. United States contingency forces must be allowed to deploy (as required) with a low yield nuclear packaqe capable of working as a deterrent against regional powers. This same tactic has worked extremely well in Europe for 45 years. Therefore, the same deterrent options will bina about peace in the emerging regional world, when properly employed. However, the primary deterrent force has always been the threat of nuclear weapons to balance off conventional force advantages and maintain peace. Thus. the NATO strategy for the defense of Europe will no longer strictly follow the framework of forward defense along the inter-German border. While.
REGIONAL COIIFLICTS -THPEAT OF NUCLEAR WAR
THE DEN$3E OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) AGREENENT
this strategy has aided the peace process in Europe, it will no longer be the focal point for defense planning. In its place will be a policy ot forward presence where U.S. and NATO troops will be separated by hundreds of miles trom their Russian adversaries east of the Urals The new, reduced NATO force structure will employ a mobile force to react to massing hostile troops along the eastern most approaches to a unified Germany. This force will have d mission to intercept. engage, and deny access or penetration into Germany territory. It will be torced to trade space for time aoainst a superior Soviet at-24 tacking force or employ tactical nuclear weapons to stop the penetration.
The proposed NATO operational strategy calls for the tormation of multinational corps. This force will be composed ot several nations in peace as tie' as in war.
For example, the U.S. and German forces may provide a mechanized and armored division to till out the corps combat strength. The corps covering force may consist of forces from Holland or Belgium to seek out the enemy and determine his intentions. The command challenges of tighting a multinational corps are significant. In fact, the same historical flaws found ri the OVI et.
Wcluaw Pact c,.wrat focmatiors may soon plague the NATO Klt lnational (Co'ps: uncertain comflniulcations between difteent nations. dItte-nt tactics and orqanizations; and less than desirable equipment interoperabi ity.
The U.S. forces are expected to be OPCON to the NATO Commnander. They must pro vide their own logistical support, but army-level command and control will come trom NATO. The challenges of interoperability will play a heavy hard in determining the strengths and weaknesses of such an alignment. A final consideration is the possibility that a complete U.S. division may be temporarily removed trom the multinational force to fight an out-of-sector battle perhaps in the Middle East. The division should deploy with the ability to employ chemical or nuclear weapons as a last resort.
CFE RECOMMENDAT!ONS
As a result of the CFE discussions, certain things must take place on both sides to insute a lasting peace in Europe. First. the U.S. must re ain the ability to generate a highly capable and balanced ground, air and naval conventional/nuclear force. Army tactical nuclear weapons are the basic buildina block, which provide the framework to support the smaller force. This is necessary to show United States resolve to support the NATO Allies and to signal 25 their intent to use nuclear weapons as a last resort. Second. the U.S. must rely on a forward presence in Europe to deter a crisis, while still maintaining regional stability and global Influence. Third. the U.S./NATO conventional force must be capable of being employed without waiting for newly conscript ed soldiers to round out the Army or new equipment production lines to be mobilized. The European based units should not be a hollow army consisting of unit flags and only 60% of the soldiers required to man the equipment and defend the NATO Alliance. Fourth. conventional and nuclear equipment modernization must continue so that our soldiers are provided with state-of-the-art 14 equipment capable of winning on the battlefield. Fifth. the U.S. and NAT9 raserve f;occe must be easily deployable ano fully capable of pCovilding the sustainment necessar-y to insure the defeat ot enemy forces olucing a pro:tractetj
War.
Sixth. the multinational torce must be fully trained and rlnecooeciDle before Lhe r;s ; ieain lo fire. Finally, the C'L T-E t' nu.t bc.
both si,Jes. Fv'eeJCom .'or obsecrvecs to watch milit,.-y 3cti,,iLie3 on both sieS will prevent arcae scale force aleneration or Qre-atlack contiauraton. 1
United States secured victory in the Cold War through nuclear detetence bacKed by so!id action. To lay down our swords now may mean defeat in the tA.tjce. He Knows they will work and be responsive to his immediate needs. Botn air and sea delivered systems provoke detailea consideration by an adverarv Wecise they may suggest a strategic employment or nuclear escalation 0agass-0. Hioshima;. But tactical delivery systems are already deployed in theater tor conventional purpcses therefore army assets otter ground commanders a more !;e<ibbe option for limited nuclear use in Europe as well as n thud w¢, , cencinal conflicts.
UJperationally. the army penerally prefers greater flexibility aqainsr are 3rrvv at potential agare5sors. This qupporAs continued tieldir, a t a mixed force of Army nuclear systems, missiles and cannons posseqsing duat caDoaoe (nuclear and conventional) delivecy systems. Thui same option orovwe' greater tlexibil ity to the newly formed NATO Multinational Coos as they Prepare to fight on a nonlinear battlefield.
The preferred option of using Army nuclear systems offers a flexibie response to a variety of targets. Low-yield surface-to-surface missiles ace best suited for attack against heavily armored formations. nuclear delivery units, tactical headquarters and fixed targets. Artillery-fired atomic projectiles (AFAPS) continue to provide low-yield, accurate and responsive attack capability tor use against close-in targets that would place enemy forces ot 29 high risk when massed for an attack. Organic Army Nuclear assets provide a battlefield mix of delivery systems which reduces the potential of catastrophic failure of a single delivery system. Army systems provide a critical link between battlefield continaency planning and the threatened employment ot U.S. strategic systems. The potentiil use of U.S. Army organic nuclear systems deployed as an element of U.S. Multinational forces symbolizes for U.S. and NATO -more than any other nuclear employment option -a direct and believable tie between European secucity and 
WHERE SHOULD WE GO WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE I 9O'S
The tutuce role ot nuclear weapons should be baged on the toundation of their success in deterring war in Europe. The United States and Soviet Union will continue to determine their gloDal and European military strength on their respective nuclear forces. They both realize that they have the capabilitj to inflict unacceptable destruction upon one another.
The threat of tactical nuclear weapons remains as part of the U.S. -NATO deterrent capability. The U.S. should retain the ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons in all types of weather against a variety ot tarqets to uestroy a superior enemy force. This clean weapon eliminates most residual radiation: it has thus become a leading candidate weapon to be used in future support of our around troops.
For tactical targets, it increases military efficiency and reduces collateral 32 damage through the use of enhanced radiation weapons.
This weapon system has tremendous advantages when employed against a fortified enemy in a place like Kuwait City.
In such situations. the enemy uses all ot the cover and concealment a city has to offer. 
RECOMMENDED FUTURE USE
In the 1990's we should retain a limited number of enhanced radiation Tactical Nuclear Weapons to insure the continued peace in Europe and in other regional arenas throughout the world. However. one day both sides may be satistied that the risk of war is low enough to completely eliminate the tactical nuclear systems. But. tor now the world situation is currently too fluid and unpredictable to support that decision before all of the facts are known. Finally. the United States must stand ready to add deterrence to regaional contlict through means of a deployable tactical nuclear force. No price is too high to pay for continued peace In the world.
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